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SECURITIES REGULATION: SEVENTH CIRCUIT HOLDS
THAT WITHDRAWABLE CAPITAL ACCOUNTS ARE NOT
"SECURITIES" WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE
EXCHANGE ACT
Relying upon legislative history and the particular characteristics
of the accounts, the Seventh Circuit in Tcherepnin v. Knight held
that withdrawable capital accounts in a savings and loan association
are not "securities" within the ambit of the antifraud provisions of
the Securities Exchange Act. This note explores the bases of the
court's decision and suggests an alternative resolution which both
furthers the purposes of the Act and preserves traditional state
regulatory power in the savings and loan area.
FOLLOWING the financial decline of City Savings, an Illinois-char-
tered savings and loan association, the Tcherepnins, holders of with-
drawable capital accounts in that association,1 brought an action seek-
ing to rescind their purchases of shares and to be classified as creditors
of the institution.2 The Tcherepnins alleged that their deposits had
1 Withdrawable capital accounts, as defined in the Illinois Savings and Loan Act,
were ordinarily withdrawable in whole or in part at any time by the depositor. See
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 32, § 773 (a) (1965). The accounts were subject to forced retirement
by the association. Id. § 775. Furthermore, they were not negotiable and were non-
assessable for debts or losses of the association, id. §§ 762 (a), (c), 768 (c), although they
were transferable, id. § 768 (b), and carried the right to receive dividends, id. §§ 762 (b),
780, and to vote on the association's affairs, id. § 742 (d) (2). See Brief for Appellants
Knight & Hulman at 7, Reply Brief for Apellants Knight & Hulman at 3-7, Tcherepnin
v. Knight, 371 F.2d 374 (7th Cir. 1967).
Painstaking effort has been expended in differentiating these accounts from the
concept of corporate stock. See, e.g., Prather, Savings Accounts in Savings and Loan
Associations, 15 Bus. LAwYER 44 (1959). One prominent author concludes that these
should properly be characterized as general deposits, id. at 48, and denominated
"savings accounts," id. at 52. The principal distinction between the withdrawable
capital account in a savings and loan association and the savings account in a bank
is that the holder of the latter is uniformly considered to be a primary creditor of
the bank, Comment, Bank Accounts: Transfer of Property at Death, 23 U. CI. L. REv.
289, 304 n.18 (1956); see Prather, supra at 48, whereas the holder of a savings and
loan account is considered a secondary or subordinate creditor, see id. at 50. This
would apparently bear on the priority of payment of claims, but not on the nature
of the claim.
2 Since 1958 City Savings had been operating on a limited withdrawal basis as a result
of inability to meet its cash commitments. On July 9, 1959, the Illinois Savings and
Loan Act was amended to allow associations so operating to accept new deposits, despite
their condition, on an unlimited withdrawal basis. Illinois Savings and Loan Act of
1959, § 4-13 (h), [1959] Ill. Laws 716 (repealed 1965). The present suit was brought
shortly before the City Savings Association went into voluntary bankruptcy by vote of
the shareholders on July 28, 1964, but when the embarrassed institution was already
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been made in reliance upon false and misleading solicitations mailed
to them by the association in violation of section 10 (b) of the Securi-
ties Exchange Act of 1934V The plaintiffs invoked the jurisdiction
of the district court under section 27 of the Act,4 seeking to recover
their money plus interest as allowed by section 18 (a),5 thereby making
it necessary for the court to determine whether withdrawable capital
accounts were "securities" within the meaning of the Exchange Act.0
In overruling the defendants' motion to dismiss, the district court
held that such accounts were "securities." '7
Upon interlocutory appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit, in Tcherepnin v. Knight, reversed and remanded with
instructions to dismiss the complaint for lack of federal jurisdiction.9
The court held that withdrawable capital accounts were not within
the concept of a security for two reasons: (1) an examination of
legislative history indicated that these accounts were intended by
Congress to be exempt from the provisions of the Exchange Act; and
(2) an examination of the nature of the accounts indicated that they
do not possess the requisite characteristics of a "security."
The Securities Act of 1933,0 followed by the Securities Exchange
Act in 1934,". was designed to protect the investor in securities
through the prohibition of market manipulation and through the
requirement of disclosure adequate to enable a prospective investor
to make an intelligent investment decision.12 To this end, the Securi-
in the custodial care of the Director of Financial Institutions of the State of Illinois.
Tcherepnin v. Knight, 371 F.2d 374, 375 (7th Cir. 1967).
8 15 U.S.C. § 78j (b) (1964). The plaintiffs' argument seems to have been that the
failure of City Savings to acknowledge in its solicitations that its financial situation was
precarious and that it did not have federal deposit insurance for its accounts amounted
to a deceptive practice within the prohibition of this section. See 371 F.2d at 384-85
(Cummings, J., dissenting).
' 15 U.S.C. § 78aa (1964) (allows federal jurisdiction even in the absence of diversity
of citizenship).
'Id. § 78r (a) (1964).
'The SEC requested and was granted the opportunity to file an amicus brief, thus
allowing its participation in this case of first impression. 371 F.2d at 375; Brief for the
SEC as Amicus Curiae at 1-2.
7371 F.2d at 375.
8 371 F.2d 374 (7th Cir. 1967).
OId. at 379.
10 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-aa (1964).
221d. §§78a-hh (1964).
12 H.R. REP. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 2-3 (1933); see, e.g., Pasquesi, The Expand-
ing "Securities" Concept, 49 ILL. B.J. 728 (1961); Comment, Banks and the Securities
Act of 1933, 52 VA. L. REv. 117 (1966).
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ties Act, which is directed primarily at the distribution process, re-
quires registration of securities and proscribes misleading representa-
tions. This Act, with unimportant exceptions, exempted from the
registration requirements "any security issued by a . . .savings and
loan association . . . ."13 There appears to have been substantial
unanimity between the houses of Congress 14 and representatives of
the savings and loan industry15 that all savings and loan transactions
would be exempt from registration. However, spokesmen for the
industry indicated that they had no objection to the application of
the antifraud provisions to their institutions, with the attendant
requirement of disclosure to prospective investors.' 6
In contradistinction to the focusing of the Securities Act on the
offering of an issue, the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 was con-
cerned with trading after distribution. Its requirements extended
to issuers of securities listed on an exchange.' 7 Since the registration
provisions of the 1934 Act originally applied only to listed securities, 18
any specific registration exemption for savings and loan associations,
whose transactions are unlisted, would have been surplusage. Despite
its different regulatory objective, the Exchange Act employed a
definition of security almost identical to that of the Securities Act,
with the exception of the omission of the term "evidence of indebted-
ness" from the 1934 Act definition. 9
18 15 U.S.C. § 77c (a) (5) (1964). Political factors apparently motivated adoption of
the exemption. Landis, The Legislative History of the Securities Act of 1933, 28 GEo.
IVASH. L. REv. 29, 39 (1959).
I" See H.R. REP. No. 152, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 24 (1933) [hereinafter cited as 1933
REPORT].
25 Hearings on S. 2408 Before a Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on Banking and
Currency, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 181 (1950).1 Hearings on H.R. 4314 Before the House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Com-
merce, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 72-74 (1933). It should be noted that the structure of the
Act is such that, once it is established that a "security" is involved, the antifraud pro-
visions of the Act apply even though the security may have a registration exemption. 15
U.S.C. §§77c(a), 1(2), g(c) (1964); see 1 L. Loss, SECURMrs REGULATION 710 (2d ed.
1961); Pasquesi, supra note 12; Comment, 20 U. MIAMI L. REV. 919, 922 & n.27 (1966).
11 The Act's basic purposes were to require disclosure of certain information to the
investor, to prevent fraud and manipulation in trading, and to regulate the amount
of the nation's credit involved in the securities markets. See 15 U.S.C. § 78b (1964);
Peoples Sec. Co. v. SEC, 289 F.2d 268, 271 (5th Cir. 1961); 1 L. Loss, supra note 16, at
130-31.
18 Securities Exchange Act of 1934, ch. 404, § 12, 48 Stat. 892, as amended, 15 U.S.C.
§ 781 (1964).
20 The deletion of the term "evidence of indebtedness" from the 1934 Act definition
is of questionable significance. The Tcherepnin court, in construing the Exchange Act
definition, declined to analogize the instant case to cases which arose under the defini-
In 1964 the Exchange Act was amended to afford investors in the
larger unlisted companies the same protection accorded holders of
listed securities, to expand the regulatory control over those in the
securities industry, and to strengthen the standards for entrance into
that business. 20 In order to accomplish these purposes, the registra-
tion requirements were extended to issuers of over-the-counter
securities who were engaged in interstate commerce or use of the
mails and had total assets of over one million dollars and a class of
equity securities held of record by at least 750 (subsequently 500)
stockholders. 21
The extension of registration requirements to over-the-counter
issuers conceivably covered savings and loan associations whose
shares may be traded in that manner. Further, the savings and loan
registration exemption reappeared in a narrower form than its
counterpart in the Securities Act:
The provisions of the subsection [referring to registration] shall
not apply in respect of ... (c) any security, other than permanent
stock, guaranty stock, permanent reserve stock, or any similar
certificate evidencing nonwithdrawable capital, issued by a savings
and loan association, . . . which is supervised and examined by
State or Federal authority having supervision over any such insti-
tution.22
The exemption thus removes certificates evidencing withdrawable
capital accounts from the registration requirement. However, the
1934 Act's antifraud provisions, like those of the 1933 Act, apply
to any "security," irrespective of exemption from registration. The
question thus arises whether withdrawable capital accounts in a
savings and loan association, such as City Savings, are to be considered
tion in the 1933 Act, viewing the omission as significant. 371 F.2d at 379. See text
accompanying notes 50 & 51 infra. However, the dissenting judge pointed out that
the significance is debatable, in that a question of draftsmanship and not of policy
might have prompted the omission. See 371 F.2d at 380 n.3.
20 S. RE'. No. 379, 88th Cong., Ist Sess. 1-2 (1963); H.R. RP. No. 1418, 88th Cong.,
2d Sess. 1-2 (1964); see Sowards, The Securities Acts Amendments of 1964: New Regis-
tration and Reporting Requirements, 19 U. MrAm L. REv. 33, 33-35 (1964). See gen-
erally Phillips & Shipman, An Analysis of the Securities Acts Amendments of 1964,
1964 DuKE L.J. 706; Stiles, The Securities Acts Amendments of 1964, 6 CoRP,. PRAc.
COMM. 344 (1965); 41 DENY. L.C.J. 374 (1964); 39 ST. JOHN'S L. Rv. 111 (1964).
21 15 U.S.C. §781(g) (1) (1964); see Stiles, supra note 20, at 347.
2. 15 U.S.C. § 78 (g) (2) (c) (1964) (emphasis added). The narrowing of the exemption
has been deemed significant in its exclusion of capital stock. See Phillips & Shipman,
supra note 20, at 743-44.
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as "securities" and therefore subjected to the antitfraud provisions
when distributed by issuers who meet the capital asset and stock-
holder tests, even though the 1964 amendments exempt these accounts
from registration.
In considering this question, the majority opinion rejected the
contention of the SEC that the exemption from registration of certain
savings and loan securities in the 1964 amendments would have been
unnecessary had such interests not been included in the original
definition of "security." 2  The court analogized to insurance con-
tracts, exempted under the 1933 Act,24 and noted that this exemption
from registration did not mean that insurance contracts were other-
wise classifiable as a security. Rather, the exemption of insurance
contracts only indicated an excess of caution lest there be misunder-
standing as to their proper categorization. 25  With citations from
congressional hearings on the 1964 amendments, the court extended
its analogy to the substance of the transactions involved: as there is
no stock or trading in stock involved in insurance contracts, so is
there neither stock nor trading in stock involved in withdrawable
capital accounts. 26 Also, the presence of state regulation to counter
abuses in the insurance field is parallelled by extensive state regula-
tion over savings and loan associations, and such regulation is
persuasive against the need for federal intervention. 27  Summarily,
the court posited that the purpose of the Exchange Act was the regu-
lation of transactions involving actively traded securities in order to
prevent price fluctations resulting from manipulation and specula-
tion.28  The opinion indicates that those dangers were not viewed by
the court to be attendant to these savings and loan transactions.
In sharp contrast to the majority's treatment of the legislative
history, the dissenting judge attacked the analogy to exempted in-
"3 Brief for SEC as Amicus Curiae at 11-13. The Commission asserted that unless
such accounts were held to be securities, the exemption could only be interpreted "in
either of two inappropriate ways: that it is meaningless, because withdrawable shares
would be excluded by definition, or that the term 'security' refers not to withdrawable
shares but is confined solely to some other type of undefined and legislatively un-
considered security issued by a savings and loan association." Id. at 13.
,15 U.S.C. § 781(g) (2) (G) (1964).
21371 F.2d at 379 (citing H.R. REP. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 15 (1933)).
26 371 F.2d at 378 (citing Hearings on H.R. 6789, H.R. 6792, and S. 1642 Before the
Subcomm. of the House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 88th Cong., 1st
Sess. 309 (1963) [hereinafter cited as House Hearings)).
27 371 F.2d at 378.
2 See id. at 376, 377.
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surance contracts as invalid, since, in his view, such contracts did not
possess the characteristics of securities and could not have been in-
tended for inclusion in the definition.29 Further, to the dissenter, the
language of the 1933 Act which exempted "any security issued by a
... savings and loan association ... ."30 indicated that savings and
loan accounts were regarded as securities, which were exempt from
registration, but not from the antifraud provisions.81 He argued
that the 1964 amendments would not have exempted withdrawable
accounts from registration had those accounts not been within the
basic definition of a security. 2
The legislative history of the Securities Act offers only question-
able support for the majority's analogy between savings and loan
transactions and insurance contracts. During the legislative delibera-
tions, a committee report said of the insurance contract exemption:
Paragraph (8) makes clear what is already implied in the act,
namely, that insurance policies are not to be regarded as securities
subject to the provisions of the act. The insurance policy and like
contracts are not regarded in the commercial world as securities
offered to the public for investment purposes. The entire tenor of
the act would lead, even without this specific exemption, to the
exclusion of insurance policies from the provisions of the act, but
the specific exemption is included to make misinterpretation im-
possible.3
The weakness of the analogy between insurance contracts and savings
and loan transactions lies in the fact that the House report did not
direct a similar exclusionary discussion to savings and loan institu-
tions, but merely stated that their "securities" were to be exempt from
registration provided the institution confined itself to making loans
to members.8 4
Examination of the hearings held on the 1964 amendments to
the Exchange Act3s provides little clarification of the ambiguous
status of withdrawable capital accounts in savings and loan institu-
tions. Apparently the study group responsible for investigating the
proposed legislation was so concerned with the problems of other in-
"See id. at 380 (Cummings, J., dissenting).
80 15 U.S.C. § 77c (a) (5) (1964).
81871 F.2d at 879-80 (Cummings, J., dissenting).
"Id. at 880.
H.R. REP. No. 85, 78d Cong., Ist Sess. 15 (1988).
"Id.
"House Hearings, supra note 26.
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dustries that they did not investigate withdrawable capital accounts.
Instead the group summarily asserted that the primary concern of
federal securities regulation was the "permanent reserve" type ac-
counts, actually representing stock in the enterprise. 8
In summary, Congress has consistently expressed a desire to
exempt savings and loan transactions from the registration require-
ments of the securities acts; but the question as to whether withdraw-
able accounts are securities within the ambit of the antifraud pro-
visions is an open one. The court, however, concluded that, on
balance, neither legislative history nor statutory construction indi-
cated a congressional desire to subject these accounts to federal securi-
ties regulation.
As a second ground for decision, the court indicated that the
peculiar characteristics of these accounts militated- against their
classification as a security. The controlling definition is given in
section 3 (a) (10) of the Exchange Act:
The term "security" means any note, stock, treasury stock, bond,
debenture, certificate of interest or participation in any profit-
sharing agreement or in any oil, gas, or other mineral royalty or
lease, any collateral-trust certificate, preorganization certificate or
subscription, transferable share, investment contract, voting-trust
certificate, certificate of deposit, for a security, or in general, any
instrument commonly known as a security; or any certificate of
interest or participation in, temporary or interim certificate for,
receipt for, or warrant or right to subscribe to or purchase, any of
the foregoing; but shall not include currency or any note, draft, bill
of exchange, or banker's acceptance which has a maturity at the
time of issuance of not exceeding 9 months, exclusive of days of
grace, or any renewal thereof the maturity of which is likewise
limited.37
In practice, courts have been hesitant to give a strict construction
to this definition lest such an approach serve as an invitation to sharp
dealing by those desiring to avoid the provisions of federal regula-
1,",[N]ormally in many of these organizations [building and loan associations] the
person who has an interest in the association [has] ... a savings interest. He doesn't
have anything that he can usually transfer, as he can a share of stock, but in more
recent years there has been a development in this area whereby stock in these organiza-
tions has been created for sale to the public as an investment. It is in this particular
area that attention is being given to them within the purview of the securities acts."
Id. at 273 (emphasis added).
87 15 U.S.C. § 78 (c) (a) (10) (1964).
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tion.38 The judicial preference for ad hoc determinations is aided
by the presence of the term "investment contract" within the defini-
tion. When a transfer fails to fit nicely into a specific category enu-
merated, the courts tend to apply the term "investment contract" in
order to bring less standardized transactions within the coverage of
the legislation. 9 An investment contract as defined by the Supreme
Court involves an "investment of money in a common enterprise
with profits to come solely from the efforts of others.140 In a long
line of cases, the courts have been quick to find an investment con-
tract where the buyer actually provided funds for another to use in a
profit-making fashion, and where the proceeds were ratably distri-
buted to those who bought into the venture. Furthermore, a finding
of "investment contract" has frequently been made by courts con-
fronted with investment schemes which have been couched not in
terms of investment, but in terms of the purchase of commodities,
coupled with separate contracts for the maintenance, service, or sale
of the commodities by the seller or a third party, with the profits
therefrom to be remitted to the buyer or customer.41
38 SEC v. Crude Oil Corp. of America, 93 F.2d 844, 846-47 (7th Cir. 1937); see SEC
v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 299 (1946). Although the courts seldom explicitly
acknowledge this rationale as the basis for their broad interpretation of "security," the
sentiment is inherent in their treatment of the cases, see note 41 infra, and especially
evident in decisions involving Blue Sky laws, the background against which the federal
securities laws were drawn, see, e.g., State v. Gopher Tire 9- Rubber Co., 146 Minn. 52,
177 N.W. 937 (1920); State v. Whiteaker, 118 Ore. 656, 661, 247 P. 1077, 1079 (1926).
The refusal of the judiciary to attempt a specification of the components of the security
concept has been criticized as having an inhibiting effect on businessmen who hesitate
to promote something which might later be determined to have been a "security"
subject to the federal acts. Shipley, The SEC's Expanding Definition of a Security, 37
N.Y.S.B.J. 521 (1965).
3 See cases cited note 42 infra. The SEC argued that the accounts in the instant
case could be classified as stock, profit-sharing agreements, transferable shares, or invest-
ment contracts. Brief for SEC as Amicus Curiae at 14-15. Since the various categories
of interests covered in the Securities Act definition were not meant to be mutually ex-
clusive, 1 L. Loss, supra note 16, at 488-89, a given transaction may well fit one or
more categories, see, e.g., SEC v. C.M. Joiner Leasing Corp., 320 U.S. 344, 351 (1943);
SEC v. Wickham, 12 F. Supp. 245, 249 (D. Minn. 1935). However, the "stock" and
"transferable share" arguments would seem to be based primarily on the outmoded
share terminology, rather than any substantive characteristics of the withdrawable capi-
tal accounts. See Prather, supra note 1. See generally note 1 supra.
The suggestion that the accounts could be profit-sharing agreements would seem to
be vitiated by the fact that no matter how much profit an association makes, the
depositors receive only the amount remaining after certain distributions to mandatory
and optional reserve accounts. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 32, §§ 778 (c), 779 (1965). Under some
circumstances, no dividends at all may be paid. Id. § 780 (b) (1).
40 SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 301 (1946).
" The courts have not been guided by the nature of the commodity behind the
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Linking these investment contract cases are three central themes:
(1) there is commingling42 in the sense that the buyer's funds or
chattels, or the proceeds from the venture, are pooled-the "common
enterprise" characteristic; (2) there is separation of ownership and
management with accompanying reliance by the buyer upon the
abilities of the seller-the "efforts of others" characteristic; and (3)
there is an element of speculation-the "profit" 43 characteristic. The
last requirement is illustrated in SEC v. Variable Annuity Life In-
surance Company of America,4 4 where variable annuities were held
not entitled to the exemption afforded insurance contracts, on the
instrument. SEC v. C.M. Joiner Leasing Corp., 320 U.S. 344, 352 (1943); see SEC v.
Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co. of America, 359 U.S. 65 (1959) (variable annuities); SEC
v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293 (1946) (units in a citrus grove); Roe v. United States,
287 F.2d 435 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 824 (1961) (mineral lease); Blackwell v.
Bentsen, 203 F.2d 690 (5th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 347 U.S. 925 (1953) (units in a citrus
grove); Penfield Co. v. SEC, 143 F.2d 746 (9th Cir.), aff'd, 330 U.S. 585 (1944) (whiskey
warehouse receipts); Atherton v. United States, 128 F.2d 463 (9th Cir. 1942) (oil leases);
SEC v. Universal Serv. Ass'n, 106 F.2d 232 (7th Cir. 1939), cert. denied, 308 U.S. 622
(1940) (application blanks for contributions to "Plenocracy'); SEC v. Crude Oil Corp.
of America, 93 F.2d 844 (7th Cir. 1937) (oil royalties); SEC v. American Int'l Say. &
Loan Ass'n, 199 F. Supp. 341 (D. Md. 1961) (capital stock); SEC v. Los Angeles Trust
Deed & Mtge. Exch., 186 F. Supp. 830 (S.D. Cal.), modified on other grounds, 285 F.2d
162 (9th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 366 U.S. 919 (1961) (discounted trust deed notes);
SEC v. Bourbon Sales Corp., 47 F. Supp. 70 (W.D. Ky. 1942) (whiskey warehouse re-
ceipts); SEC v. Bailey, 41 F. Supp. 647 (S.D. Fla. 1941) (tung trees); United States v.
Davis, 40 F. Supp. 246 (N.D. Ill. 1941) (membership in cooperative association); SEC
v. Payne, 35 F. Supp. 873 (S.D.N.Y. 1940) (silver foxes); SEC v. Pyne, 33 F. Supp. 988
(D. Mass. 1941) (fishing vessels); SEC v. Timetrust, Inc., 28 F. Supp. 34 (N.D. Cal.
1939), appeal dismissed, 118 F.2d 718 (9th Cir. 1941) (stock); SEC v. Wickham, 12 F.
Supp. 245 (D. Minn. 1935) (contract for market speculation); Riegel v. Haberstro, 151
Pa. Super. 539, 30 A.2d 645 (1943) (contributions to "Plenocracy'". See also Notes, 28
CALIF. L. REv. 410 (1940); 46 COLUM. L. REv. 885 (1946); 37 COLUM. L. REv. 650 (1937);
36 COLUm. L. Rxv. 683 (1936); 53 Mica. L. RFv. 140 (1954).
" The commingling requirement is somewhat undercut by the holding in SEC v.
Payne, 35 F. Supp. 873 (S.D.N.Y. 1940), where foxes were earmarked and identified to
particular purchasers. However, various factors in that case tended to supply the
requirement. For example, the form of contract used by the seller previously had
provided for a pooling of offspring and profits. Also, the seller guaranteed a certain
minimum number of offspring per year (3) and would make up deficiencies out of his
own stock. Thus there was some possibility that the buyer might not receive in all
cases the offspring of his breeding foxes. Furthermore, the court emphasized that no
purchaser had ever asked for actual delivery. Id. at 878.
48 But see Silver Hills Country Club v. Sobieski, 55 Cal. 2d 811, 361 P.2d 906, 13 Cal.
Reptr. 186 (1961); Miller, Cooperative Apartments: Real Estate or Securities?, 45 BosToN
U.L. R v. 465 (1965); 50 CALIF. L. Rv. 156 (1962). The thrust of the Silver Hills de-
cision was to replace the profit requirement with a requirement that there be an element
of risk attached to any capital investment. For a discussion of various concepts of
"profit," including an analysis of the Silver Hills case, see Coffey, The Economic
Realities of a "Security": Is there a More Meaningful Formula?, 18 WEsr. Rrs. L. Rv.
367, 398-403 (1967).
"359 U.S. 65, 71 (1959).
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theory that the issuer is not required to give a fixed return, but only
to remit a prorata amount based upon gains and losses from the in-
vestment portfolios in which these contracts participate. Conceiv-
ably, it is the characteristic of a variable return which leads courts to
find a "security" because of the possibility of fraud and loss to the
investor in situations where no definite return is guaranteed. Hence,
on the basis of investment contract cases concerning everything from
tung trees to whiskey warehouse receipts, the acts can hardly be said,
despite the majority opinion in the instant case, to apply only to those
situations in which there is active trading in the "securities."
Despite the broad range of transactions included under the above
definitional approach, the court in Tcherepnin took a narrow cate-
gorical approach to the security definition, summarily dismissing
the applicability of the "investment contract" term. 45 The court
asserted that withdrawable capital accounts fit no category in the
section 3 (a) (10) definition save perhaps an "instrument commonly
known as a 'security,'-46 and that this possibility was vitiated by
the action of the Illinois legislature in indicating, while statutorily
creating such accounts, that they were not intended to be securities.47
Furthermore, examining the characteristics of the accounts, the court
noted that they may be issued in unlimited amounts; they are not
covered by the securities article of the Uniform Commercial Code;
they are transferable only by assignment and are not negotiable; they
are subject to forced redemption by the depositor and to retirement
at the demand of the board of directors; they are fully matured and
withdrawable at the time of issuance; they do not include preemptive
rights; they are evidenced by an account book; and they do not entitle
their holders to inspect the association's books and records, although
the holders may vote for directors, give proxies, and receive divi-
dends. The court posited that these characteristics render the
,3,,An 'investor' in a savings and loan association lends his money to be with-
drawable at will and to earn interest. The relationship with the enterprise is much
more that of debtor-creditor than investment. The profit is derived from loans
to other members of the savings and loan association. This is not investment in
a common enterprise with profits to come solely from the efforts of others." 871 F.2d
at 377.
"6 Id. at 376.
"1Id. Apparently, the court reasoned from the Illinois Savings and Loan Act, ILL.
REv. STAT. ch. 32, § 768 (c) (1965), which indicates that withdrawable capital certificates
and account books are not to be subject to Article 8, concerning investment securities, of
the Uniform Commercial Code.
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accounts in question "unlike the ordinary concept of a security."48
Finally, the majority held that the accounts represented a debtor-
creditor relationship. 49 The court apparently attached much weight
to indications in the legislative history of the 1934 Act that the term
"evidence of indebtedness," present in the definition of security in
the 1933 Act, was excluded from the 1934 definition in connection
with consideration of accounts of building and loan associations.50
Hence, the court concluded that the debtor-creditor relationship evi-
denced by withdrawable capital accounts was not meant to fall within
the ambit of the Exchange Act.51
The determination of the majority that these accounts are not
classifiable as securities would seem open to attack on the investment
contract theory, though possibly supportable by the debtor-creditor
analysis. The extensive argument made by the SEC that withdraw-
able capital accounts satisfy the requirements of an investment con-
tract is persuasive: there is commingling of the depositors' funds
in a pool from which loans are to be made; there is complete separa-
tion of ownership and management; and there is an element of
speculative gain, for since the return on money deposited is a portion
of the profit made by the institution on loans, the dividend rate will
follow fluctuations in the money market.
To the extent that the court failed adequately to distinguish, or
seriously to counter, the investment contract argument, its reasoning
is questionable. However, considering the debtor-creditor approach,
the court would seem to be on somewhat firmer ground in rejecting
the "security" concept. Unlike a stockholder who may lose the
entirety of his investment if the enterprise fares badly, the savings
account holder stands to lose nothing as his funds are fully withdraw-
able at any time. Viewed as a deposit,52 the withdrawable capital
account is analogous to an ordinary bank savings account, plainly
not a security.5 3 Also, as deposits, these accounts would seem to par-
take of the nature of short term debt transactions specifically ex-
48371 F.2d at 376. See note 1 supra for a more complete discussion of the char-
acteristics of these accounts.
"9 371 F.2d at 377-79.
10 See generally Reinoehl, Basic Pattern and Coverage of the 1933 Act, 34 U.M.K.C.L.
REv. 172 (1966). But see note 19 supra.
81 See 371 F.2d at 378 (citing Hearings on S. 875 Before the Senate Comm. on
Banking and Currency, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 94-120 (1933)).
52 Prather, supra note 1, at 47-69.Is 15 U.S.C. § 78c (a) (12). But see Brief for SEC as Amicus Curiae at 26.
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empted from the definition of security.5 4 However, with regard to
the debtor-creditor argument, a telling point was scored by the dis-
senter, who pointed out that these depositors, unlike creditors, were
not entitled to interest, but only to a distribution of the profits of the
association in the form of dividends.05
The weaknesses in the majority opinion, sharply pointed out by
the dissent, are readily apparent, and surely did not escape the notice
of the court. This leads to the conclusion that policy considerations,
rather than substantive definitions, influenced the holding that these
accounts were not subject to the registration or antifraud provisions
of the federal securities acts. The lack of controlling congressional
intent, coupled with the uncertain applicability of the security
definition to withdrawable capital accounts, left the court free to
implement the policy it found most desirable. Obviously that policy
decreed the immunization of withdrawable capital accounts from
federal securities regulation. Possibly this immunization was desired
by the court because the savings and loan industry is presently a
highly regulated one, and thus the need for additional regulation
under the Exchange Act is unclear.
In addition to stringent regulation under state law, state-chartered
savings and loan institutions frequently elect to seek coverage under
,two federal programs-the Federal Home Loan Bank System 0 and the
Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation (FSLIC).5 7 Savings
and loan associations, savings banks, and insurance companies which
join the System must be examined at least once a year by representa-
tives of the Federal Home Loan Bank Board.58 The assets and liabili-
ties of the institution are verified, and a detailed audit of its accounts
is made. Insurance from FSLIC is compulsory for federally-chartered
at "The term 'security'... shall not include ... any note ... which has a maturity
at the time of issuance of not exceeding nine months .... " Securities Exchange Act
of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78c (a) (10) (1964). As the Tcherepnin court notes, 371 F.2d at 377,
these accounts are mature at issue. The dissenting judge, however, emphasizes that these
accounts do not represent short term commercial paper, and therefore do not fall with-
in this excluded category. Id. at 383.
A further argument against the idea that these accounts represent investment
capital is found in the Illinois Savings arnd Loan Act. Whereas supervisors and ex-
aminers of savings and loans are forbidden to hold certain types of accounts, they
may hold withdrawable capital accounts. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 32, § 841.3 (1965).
:5 371 F.2d at 383 (Cummings, J., dissenting).
T Federal Home Loan Bank Act §§ 1-30, 12 U.S.C. §§ 1421-60 (1964).
' National Housing Act §§ 401-07, 12 U.S.C. §§ 1724-30 (1964).
Federal Home Loan Bank Act § 20, 12 U.S.C. § 1440 (1964).
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associations and may be obtained by state institutions.59 Coverage is
granted only after ascertainment that the insured state-chartered
associations follow fiscal policies approved by federal examiners.
It might seem that the pitfalls for the investor against which the
federal securities acts were designed to guard are rare in the savings
and loan industry. However, the background of the present case
lessens the credibility of such a general statement, for City Savings,
in trouble financially, was allowed to continue accepting deposits
without advising depositors of their unstable situation. Conceivably,
such a situation would not have arisen had City Savings been re-
quired to proceed in accordance with the disclosure mandates of the
antifraud sections of the securities acts. It is precisely the possibility
of loss to the investor which, as noted earlier,60 has impelled some
courts toward a finding of "security" in a given transaction. 61 The
risk of loss from insured withdrawable accounts in savings and loan
associations, of course, seems negligible. Yet, where insurance does
not protect the accounts, losses can occur as the instant case indicates.
Perhaps, then, it would not have been an unreasonable extension of
the coverage of the 1934 Act for the court to have held that with-
drawable capital accounts in an uninsured institution are securities
amenable to the antifraud provisions, while such accounts in an in-
sured institution are outside the definition of security. This analysis
could be based on the concept that an uninsured institution is effec-
5' As of 1961, the great majority of savings and loan associations belonging to the
Federal Home Loan Bank System participated in the FSLIC insurance program.
THE FEDERAL HOME LOAN BANK SYSTEM 26 (1961). At present, the insurance covers
up to $15,000 per account. National Housing Act § 405 (a), 12 U.S.C. § 1728 (a) (Supp.
1966).
co See text preceding note 45 supra.
al One writer has attempted to structure a scheme of analysis to determine the
presence of a "security." Coffey, supra note 43. In answer to the question he poses
himself, "What characteristics or features of a transaction necessitate its being subject
to the rather specialized antifraud protection afforded by the securities laws?", id.
at 373, the writer posits "that risk to initial investment, though not determinative, is
the single most important economic characteristic which distinguishes a security from
the universe of other transactions." Id. at 375. Further, he casts a critical eye at the
propensity of courts to emphasize the element of possible profit, or speculative gain,
rather than properly emphasizing the risk of loss of the initial investment, see id., as
properly delineated in the Joiner decision and reiterated in Silver Hills, id. at 381-82.
Determining the presence of a security through an examination of the risk-of-loss
element would accord well with the conclusion reached by this note-that the presence
or absence of account insurance should be determinative on the issue of security. See
text accompanying note 62 infra.
tively receiving investments which will have no more protection than
that normally accorded risk capital.
Classification of uninsured withdrawable accounts as securities
would undoubtedly stimulate uninsured associations to procure de-
posit insurance as an alternative to complying with the federal securi-
ties acts. Indeed, the holding would probably provide incentive for
the states to require that state-chartered savings and loan associations
insure depositor accounts,62 since by establishing this requirement
the states could remove these accounts from regulation under the
federal securities scheme and retain them within the ambit of state
regulation.
a2 Because of the wide publicity given "insured savings," the ordinary investor prob-
ably takes for granted that his deposits in a savings institution are insured. While it
would not seem unduly burdensome to require of a state that it provide insurance
for accounts sufficient to justify this expectation, the history of the Idaho compulsory
participation program raises doubts as to whether the federal program provides an
appropriate insurance vehicle. The Idaho statute required FSLIC insurance for
associations formed after a specified date, though established units could still elect non-
participation. See IDAHO CODE ANN. § 30-1301A (Supp. 1965). Shortly after its adop-
tion, this provision was successfully attacked (1) as making an arbitrary distinction
between new and old institutions, and (2) for unconstitutionally delegating legislative
authority to a federal agency which could alter its regflations without prior state
approval. See Idaho Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Roden, 82 Idaho 128, 850 P.2d 225 (1960).
Irrespective of the validity of these arguments, they do serve to reflect the desire of
some tribunals to attempt a local solution to investor problems. In instances where this
viewpoint prevails, implementation of a state funded and managed program would be
acceptable, though the existence of individualized structures reflects limited admini-
strative efficiency.
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